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Slave Systems of the Old Testament
and the American South:
A Study In Contrasts
Nathan Andersen
Though a sketchpad of the Israelite slave system is available in Old Testament
text, it is still difficult to ascertain exactly how biblical masters and slaves
related to one another on a daily basis. How should modern biblical readers
understand slavery in the Bible? They should understand that slavery did
exist and probably flourished in ancient Israel. However, biblical slavery can
be distinguished from Southern slavery in important ways. The Old
Testament slave laws established a threshold level of humanity and dignity,
which the Israelites were obligated not to cross, whereas the Southern slave
system negated the existence of the person, evidencing a total devaluation of
humanity. The check that prevented the Israelite slave system from paralleling the Southern slave system was the realization by each Hebrew master that
they too were slaves to their God.

Language is not static but, in fact, changes over time. Culture,
demography, and historical circumstance all influence how societies define the words they use. Thus, for a proper reading of ancient texts, it is imperative for modern readers to take into account
the way in which a given term was defined in the ancient context.
The word “slave,” as used in Old Testament text, is a term
often misunderstood by contemporary readers of the Bible because contemporary readers seek to understand the biblical slave
system by overlaying a modern definition upon it. One scholar has
noted, “The problems attending the use of the term slavery are
basic to the very nature of language. The meaning of the term
Nathan Andersen received his B.A. in English from Brigham Young
University in 2000 and is a 2003 graduate of the J. Reuben Clark Law
School at Brigham Young University.
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‘slavery’ is determined not only by the spoken or literary setting,
but also by the effective history of a given people.”1 Modern notions of slavery are complicated by the fact that in many ancient
societies, the term “slave” was used to refer to many different
forms of servile conditions,2 not just the chattel slave familiar to
modern readers of the Bible.
Modern readers of the Old Testament3 may equate modern
notions of slavery with the forms of slavery practiced in ancient
Israel. Such modern notions of slavery are heavily influenced by
the American civil rights movement, the American Civil War, and
the African slave trade,4 and have recently experienced a public revival of sorts via dialogue regarding slave reparations. Putting the
two slave systems on an equal footing, without a proper comparison, denies modern Bible readers a full understanding of the legal
and religious ramifications of slavery in the Bible.
This paper juxtaposes the slave laws in the Old Testament
with those of the pre-Civil War American South. Part II introduces various ancient Near Eastern laws that may have influenced

1

Dexter Callender, Jr., “Servants of God(s) and Servants of Kings in Israel
and the Ancient Near East,” Semeia 83/84 (1998): 67–68.
2
Raymond Westbrook, “The Development of Law In the Ancient Near
East: Slave and Master In Ancient Near Eastern Law,” Chicago-Kent Law Review
70 (1995): 1631, 1634, 1640. Westbrook explains, “[T]he term ‘slave’ was used to
refer not only to a person owned in law by another but to any subordinate in the
social ladder” (1634). Professor Westbrook provides several examples of servile
conditions that may have been encompassed under the ancient term “slave.”
Such examples include: subjects of a king, subjects to God, heads of households,
“classes of workers attached to an institution (palace or temple) or to an estate,
debtors who volunteer themselves into servitude to repay a debt, and non-citizens in a foreign nation” (1634–38).
3
The purpose of this article is to contrast the slave system of the Old
Testament Israelite nation with the slave system in place in the Antebellum
South. Evidence of slavery may be found in the New Testament; however, it is
not the intent of this article to expound upon those connections.
4
Ibid.
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the slave laws of the Old Testament. Part III discusses the legal
mechanisms by which individuals were initiated into servitude—
how individuals became slaves in the Old Testament as well as in
the South. Part IV compares the legal status of Old Testament
slavery to that in the American South by analyzing the master/servant relationship, laws regarding property ownership, the duration
of servitude, manumission laws, and fugitive slave laws. Part V
examines the legal parameters regarding the treatment of slaves
in each respective legal system, and finally, Part VI offers a brief
conclusion.

Ancient Near Eastern Laws
Old Testament texts clearly reveal that slavery existed as a
vibrant Israelite institution. The Code of the Covenant (Exod.
21–22),5 the Holiness Code (Lev. 25), and the Deuteronomic Code
(Deut. 15) collectively provide much of what modern scholars
know and understand regarding the legal rules and regulations of

The extent to which the Code of the Covenant is one coherent legal code
or the result of multiple redactions is an issue modern scholars have yet to resolve.
For example, Raymond Westbrook argues that the Code of the Covenant is “part
of a widespread literary-legal tradition and can only be understood in terms of
that tradition. The starting point for interpretation must therefore be the
presumption that the Covenant Code is s coherent text comprising clear and
consistent laws, in the same manner as its cuneiform forbears.” Raymond
Westbrook, “What is the Covenant Code?” in Theory and Method in Biblical and
Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development, ed. Bernard M.
Levinson (Sheffield, England: Sheffield, 1994) 15, 36. Others refute Professor
Westbrook’s theory that diachronic analysis is “methodologically invalid,” arguing that the inconsistencies and incoherency in the Covenant Code evidence the
existence of many different influences on the text itself and substantial textual reworking. See, e.g., Bernard M. Levinson, “The Case for Revision and
Interpolation within the Biblical Legal Corpora,” in Theory and Method in
Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development, ed. Bernard
M. Levinson (Sheffield, England: Sheffield, 1994) 37–39.
5
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slavery in biblical society.6 These texts, however, fail to adequately
explain where the slave tradition in the Old Testament originated.
Considering that the Israelites viewed themselves as the subjects of
harsh Egyptian servitude,7 it is somewhat surprising that slavery
existed as such a dominant aspect of Israel society. What factors
contributed to this irony? How was the institution of slavery
transposed from a harsh institution into the societal norm? Many
scholars suggest that the slave traditions of neighboring ancient
Near Eastern societies may have significantly influenced the conception of slavery in ancient Israel.8 Thus, before the Southern and
Old Testament systems of slavery can be effectively compared, it
may be helpful to identify how ancient Near Eastern slave laws influenced the sources, legal status, and treatment of slaves in the
Old Testament.
Sources of Slavery in the Ancient Near East. Much of what
modern scholars know regarding the laws of ancient Near Eastern
societies comes from ancient law codes,9 which one scholar
described as “academic treatises on law expressed in casuistic
form” rather than the legislatively enacted legal codes familiar to
6
Modern biblical scholars present varying conclusions as to how these three
code sections relate to each other. For example, Adrian Schenker argues that “the
[collective] laws for the release of slaves form a coherent system.” Adrian
Schenker, “The Biblical Legislation on the Release of Slaves: The Road from
Exodus to Leviticus,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 78 (1998): 23, 33.
7
Exodus 1:14 describes Israelite servitude to the Egyptians as “bitter with
hard bondage.”
8
See, e.g., Schenker 23–41 (asserting that political pressure from foreigners
living within Israelite society greatly influenced the shaping of the Israelite laws
regarding debt-slavery).
9
The main law codes and sources of law relied upon in this article are as follows: The Code of UrNammu (CU), the Code of Lipit-Ishtar (CL), the Code of
Eshnunna (CE), the Code of Hammurabi (CH), the Hittite laws (HL), the
Middle Assyrian Laws (MAL), and the Neo-Babylonian Laws (NBL). For a summary of many of the scholarly questions that have arisen with respect to these law
codes, see Jeffries M. Hamilton, Social Justice and Deuteronomy, Society of
Biblical Literature Dissertation Series, no. 136 (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press,
1992) 56–62.
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contemporary society.10 Another scholar referred to them as an
“enumeration of case decisions around a series of themes with
the purpose of serving as a guide to judges.”11 Regardless of the
exact purpose behind these law codes, they serve as an invaluable
porthole into the legal and social world of the ancient Near East
and perhaps help to explain the origin of certain Old Testament
slave customs.
There are essentially four general ways in which slaves were
acquired in the ancient Near East. First, the majority of slaves
were most likely prisoners of war12 or chattel slaves, who were carried back to the capturing nation to work manual labor.13 These
slaves were often purchased “into the service of temple communities, royal estates, or the estates of high ranking nobility rather
than the private households of average citizens.”14 Such may have
been the case with Joseph who was sold by the Midianites to
Potiphar in Egypt (Gen. 37:38).15 Foreign slaves, used to replenish
the slave supply during times of peace, were often granted different rights and privileges than native slaves.16
The second source of slaves was that of a debt-slave. Debt
slavery was often limited by a specific duration of anywhere from
10

Westbrook, “The Development of Law in the Ancient Near East,” 1631,

1633.
11
Victor H. Matthews, “The Anthropology of Slavery In the Covenant
Code,” Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation
and Development, ed. Bernard M. Levinson (Sheffield, England: Sheffield, 1994)
119, 120.
12
Ibid., 122 (“Despite the increased numbers of persons taken in warfare,
the idea of permanent chattel status, on the North American model . . . was unknown in the ancient Near East”).
13
Muhammad A. Dandamayev, “Ancient Near East,” vol. 6 of The Anchor
Bible Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992) 58, 59.
These slaves were mainly used to construct canals, roads, palaces, and other public improvements (58–59). See also James Moss, Slavery in the Book of Mormon, 3
(forthcoming).
14
Matthews, 124.
15
Ibid.
16
See Moss, 3–4.
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three to fifty years,17 as well as by a general release for all slaves
and their families.18 Westbrook asserts that, where a debtor
pledged himself or another in order to repay a debt, the creditor
understood that “[t]he seller was, under certain conditions, allowed to buy back, to ‘redeem,’ that property at the original
price.”19 A debt-slave who had been redeemed was usually not exonerated from all liability but merely became subordinate to a new
creditor.20
Destitute and impoverished freemen could sell themselves21
and sometimes their children22 into slavery during times of
famine:
Enslavement for famine was similar to enslavement for debt,
but was not always identical. The sale of a child in times of
famine could always be regarded as a sale made under duress
with the price being a debt. Sometimes, however, there was no
price. Rather, free persons gave their children or themselves
into slavery in return for being kept alive until the famine was
over.23

Dandamayev, 59. The Code of Hammurabi, CH 117, provided that a man
could sell his wife or son to pay a debt. The wife and/or son would serve in the
house of the creditor for three years, only to be released into freedom on the
fourth year. In Nuzi, debt slavery often lasted up to fifty years. However, no such
law limiting the duration of a debt slave existed in Assyria.
18
Ibid. “[T] Babylonian king Ammisaduqa in the 17th century issued an
edict, according to which all inhabitants of his kingdom who had been compelled by debt to become slaves should be released together with their families”
(59).
19
Westbrook, 1651.
20
Ibid., 1652. These new creditors were often family members.
21
Dandamayev, 59. See also Moss, 7–15.
22
Dandamayev, 59. See also Moss, 5–7.
23
Sadly, some impoverished parents, normally during times of famine,
abandoned their children, hoping a passerby would pick the child up and raise
it. See, e.g., Westbrook, 1646; Dandamayev, 59.
17
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Additionally, a man who lacked inheritance rights might sell
himself into slavery in order to secure some form of inheritance
upon the death of his master.24 In “Neo-Babylonian documents
and Aramaic papyri of the fifth century B.C. from Egypt, slaves
were sometimes freed with the stipulation that they continue to
serve the master or provide him with food as long as he was
alive.”25
Third, an individual could be born into slavery.26 “Such slaves
could have been the offspring of a union of master and slave . . .
or of slaves.”27 For example, the Code of Hammurabi (CH 171)
provides that a child born to a slave woman and fathered by the
slave’s master does not inherit with the master’s freeborn children,
but may be freed upon the master’s death.
Fourth, free persons could become enslaved by breaking the
28
law. For example, the Law Code of Hammurabi (CH 53–54) provides that “where a negligent farmer had managed to flood the
whole district and did not have the means to compensate all his
24
Professor Westbrook suggests that these “reciprocal arrangements whereby
the slave was freed in return for continuing to look after his master” took several
forms: “[F]irst, the master manumitted the slave upon his death, in return for
support during the rest of his life.”

Second, the slaves’ obligation continued after their master’s death with respect
to his son even though they were free; they were bound by contract, not status,
from that point on. Third, even during their remaining period of slavery, the
grant of freedom was irrevocable. Their misconduct would result in a contractual penalty, not in cancellation of the grant. The contract thus mitigated the
effects of slavery, at least in law. In practice, however, the impossibility of paying the huge penalty would inevitably lead to their re-enslavement. (“The
Development of Law in the Ancient Near East,” 1648)

Dandamayev, 61. A Sumerian law (LS 4) provided that an adopted son
who estranged himself from his adopting parents by saying “You are not my father; you are not my mother,” would be disinherited.
26
Russ VerSteeg, Early Mesopotamian Law (Durham, North Carolina:
Academic Press, 2000) 153; Westbrook, “The Development of Law in the Ancient
Near East,” 1643.
27
Westbrook, “The Development of Law in the Ancient Near East,” 1643.
28
Dandamayev, 59.
25
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neighbors for their loss,” the neighbors could sell the negligent
farmer into servitude and divide the proceeds.29 This type of law
was presumably an equitable remedy necessary to compensate the
surrounding farmers for the man’s breach of contract. Another example, found in the Hittite Laws (HL 35) states, “If an overseer or
a shepherd elopes with a free woman and does not bring the brideprice for her” that he was legally obligated to pay, the woman
becomes a slave for three years to the man who was legally entitled
to receive the bride-price. Additionally, according to Sumerian
law, “[t]he wife and children of a murderer who had been sentenced to death, were also condemned to slavery.”30
Legal Status of Slaves in the Ancient Near East. Introducing
every aspect of a slave’s legal status is beyond the scope of this
analysis. Nevertheless, there are several important aspects of a
slave’s legal status that reveal what a slave’s day-to-day rights were
in comparison to his or her ancient Near Eastern master. This section will briefly introduce laws relating to the following general
topics: alienability, property ownership, manumission, and fugitive slaves.
Generally, slaves in the ancient Near East were “chattels and
could be sold, pledged, hired, given as gifts, inherited, and forfeited.”31 However, some scholars assert that debt-slaves and
famine slaves were more protected from alienability than the ordinary chattel slaves due to their rights of redemption.32 Logically, if
a debt-slave was able to redeem himself, he must have been able to
earn and hold some forms of property.33 Most likely, slaves in the
ancient Near East were only permitted to hold property if “the[ir]
Westbrook, “The Development of Law in the Ancient Near East,” 1644.
Dandamayev, 59.
31
Westbrook, “The Development of Law in the Ancient Near East,” 1660.
32
Ibid., 1662; VerSteeg, 155.
33
Dandamayev, 61, stating that “[s]ometimes slaves were permitted to possess various kinds of property (peculium).”
29
30
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master took an interest” in the slave.34 A master who had accepted
a slave under the slave’s debt repayment plan may have been more
willing to allow the slave to accumulate property in order to hasten ultimate satisfaction of the debt.
There are many reasons why a slave in the ancient Near East
would have most been able to hold property. Because of the rights
of redemption and the law regarding the general release, slaves were
often not slaves for life, and therefore would have, at some point in
time, the opportunity to reenter society as free individuals.35
Some scholars even argue that such slaves could serve as witnesses and parties in legal proceedings.36 However, it is important
to note that even though an ancient Near Eastern slave could
mortgage/buy/sell their property, they could notmortgage/buy/sell
themselves; they “remained the property of their masters, at whose
whim they could be deprived of their property and influence.”37
Many ancient Near Eastern laws dealt with the issue of
fugitive slaves. As Westbrook explained, “flight was a social
phenomenon. . . . In the case of slaves, counter-measures were directed both against the slave himself and against third parties from
whom he might seek assistance or refuge.”38 The first general
group of laws imposed punishments for housing or assisting a
fugitive slave.39 The Law Code of Hammurabi (CH 16) may
have imposed the most serious penalty for aiding and abetting
34
35

Ibid.
The following quote describes activities in which a slave could participate:

In 1st-millennium Babylonia enterprising slaves owned land, houses, and
considerable amounts of movable property. They actively participated in all
spheres of economic activity, were engaged in trade, ran taverns and workshops,
taught other persons various trades, pawned and mortgaged their property, and
they themselves received the property of others as security for loan.
(Dandamayev, 61)

Ibid.
Ibid.
38
Westbrook,”The Development of Law in the Ancient Near East,” 1670.
39
See, e.g., HL 24, CH 16, CH 15, LI 13, LI 12.
36
37
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a fugitive slave—death. Another law (LE 49–50) imposed a monetary “fine of two times the value of the slave . . . for the concealment of a fugitive slave.”40
The second group of laws provided rewards for returning a
slave to his master.41 One law (LU 17) established a reward of two
shekels of silver for returning a runaway female slave to her master. Another law (CH 17) provided a similar reward for returning
any slave to his or her master. The Hittite Laws (HL 22–23) based
the amount of the reward on the extent to which a person had to
go to retrieve and return a slave. These laws evidence the economic
necessity of being able to retain and control property in ancient
Near Eastern society.42
Treatment of Slaves in the Ancient Near East. What measures
could masters take to control and subvert their slaves into submission? In some ancient Near Eastern societies like Assyria, a
debt-slave, enjoying the right of redemption, could not be treated
as harshly as a chattel slave.43 Nevertheless, the laws regarding the
treatment of slaves in ancient Near Eastern societies were not uniform. Some laws imposed penalties on those who harmed
another’s slave. For example, the Laws of Eshnunna (LE 23) imposed a fine of two slave girls on a man who detained another
man’s slave girl in his house, causing the slave girl to die. Slaves
were usually not the beneficiaries of such laws; masters of the
harmed slaves reaped the benefits.
Further, some laws prevented masters from abusing their
slaves while disturbingly, other laws codified such mistreatment.
Westbrook argues that—with the exception of MAL A44 and CH
282, which allowed masters to cut off the ear of their disobedient
slave—“a master did not have a general right to disfigure his
Dandamayev, 60.
See, e.g., LU 17, CH 17, HL 22.
42
See also VerSteeg, 154, for other examples of fugitive slave laws.
43
Westbrook, “The Development of Law in the Ancient Near East,” 1666;
see also VerSteeg, 155–56.
40
41
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slave.”44 Other scholars agree, however, that “[s]ome slaves were
subjected to cruel forms of exploitation.”45 In particular, Chattel
slaves were most likely the recipients of maltreatment. Aside from
the actual treatment slaves received from their masters, most slaves
were marked or branded, whether physically or by wearing a tag,
for identification purposes.46

Becoming Slaves in Ancient Israel
and in the American South
Old Testament Sources of Slavery. Modern scholars suggest
three source divisions of ancient Israelite slavery: chattel
slaves,debt-slaves and forced slaves. First, the laws regarding the
purchase of chattel slaves were different depending on whether
the slaves were foreigners or Hebrews.47 Israelites were instructed
that they could only purchase chattel slaves from foreigners (Lev.
25:44).48 Hebrew slaves were never to be purchased in fee.49 God
explained the reason for this policy: “For [the Israelites] are my
servants, which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; they shall
not be sold as bondmen” (Lev. 25:42). The Israelites, per God’s
scriptural instructions, believed that God was to be their master
because he had redeemed them from their Egyptian masters. It

Westbrook, “The Development of Law in the Ancient Near East,” 1667.
Dandamayev, 60–61.
46
Moss, 17.
47
Ultimately, a slave’s legal status in Old Testament times was probably
more closely aligned with “that of a filius-familias than to that of a mere chattel”
depending on whether the slave was a Hebrew or a foreigner. Although chattel
slavery did occasionally exist in the Old Testament, most scholars agree that the
Israelite economy was not dependent upon the practice, and therefore, the practice, most likely, did not flourish for sustained periods of time in ancient Israel.
Ze’ev W. Falk, Hebrew Law In Biblical Times (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young
University Press, 2001) 114.
48
See also Callender, 74.
49
Efraim Elimelech Urbach, The Laws Regarding Slavery (New York: Arno
Press, 1979) 28.
44
45
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was therefore contrary for any Hebrew to be the master of another
Hebrew in fee simple absolute when God, in fact, owned them:
“For unto me the children of Israel are servants” (Lev. 25:55). As a
result of this public policy against Israelites owning Hebrew slaves
in fee, the term of servitude for a Hebrew slave was limited to six
years (Exod. 21:2, Deut. 15:12). A Hebrew master was to release his
slave “in the seventh” year “for nothing” (Exod. 21:2). Although
such a practice may have been the ideal,50 it makes sense that ancient Israel would frown upon extended periods of servitude for
members of their own community, for Israel had experienced the
shackles of extended servitude in Egypt for over 430 years (Exod.
12:41). On the other hand, foreign slaves, unlike Hebrew slaves,
could be owned “forever” (Lev. 25:46). Although the law of the
jubilee, which provided for a general release of all slaves every fiftieth year (Lev. 25:10)51 seems, on its face, to apply to both foreigner
and Hebrew alike, the Jubilee probably only applied to Hebrew
slaves (see, e.g., Lev. 25:46).
Interestingly, there seems to be some textual inconsistency between the seventh-year release of slaves and the general
release of the jubilee every fiftieth year. Both seem to apply to the
release of a Hebrew slave. Falk offers two explanations for this discrepancy: First, “the law of Exodus 21:2–6 was perhaps unknown
at the time of Lev. 25:10, or, [second,] . . . the former rule was not
obeyed.”52 Falk believes that the most probable explanation was
50
The account in Jeremiah 34:8–16 illustrates that, perhaps for economic
reasons, the Israelites found it difficult to strictly adhere to the manumission laws
recorded in the Holiness Code and the Code of the Covenant.
51
Lev. 25:10: “And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty
throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubile unto
you; and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every
man unto his family.” This concept of the jubilee year originates in “the religious
framework of the periodical restitutio in integrum where all things come back to
the original creation and to the original founding order. It is a periodical eschatology and a periodical purification of human society from the distortions of life
and bad luck” (Schenker, 37).
52
Falk, 87.
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that the seventh-year release was simply not obeyed.53 This belief
is supported by the account in Jeremiah 34 in which Jeremiah
rebukes the Israelites for having neglected to release “their Hebrew
slaves, male and female,” every seventh year (Jer. 34:9). Ancient
Hebrew prophets, such as Jeremiah, repeatedly rebuked the
Israelites for failing to comply with the laws of their God. The
slave laws would have been, and in fact were, sometimes ignored.
Nevertheless, prophets repeatedly reminded the Israelites of the
impetus behind the public policy of limiting terms of servitude: If
the people wanted God to keep them free, they, as a people, must
be willing to keep their slaves free (see, e.g., Jer. 34:16–17).
It may be instructive to discuss the factors that would have
motivated a Hebrew or a foreigner to voluntarily subject themselves into servitude (Exod. 21:5). Such a concept would be
completely ludicrous today. Nevertheless, voluntary servitude was
practiced in Old Testament times. A person lacking any rights of
inheritance may have voluntarily given himself to a master who,
in the absence of legal heirs, would gift inheritance rights to the
trusted slave.54 Such a symbiotic relationship most likely benefited
both parties, the master and the slave. The master received a legal
heir and someone to take care of him in his old age. The slave received an inheritance upon the death of the master. Additionally,
individuals in extreme poverty were able to voluntarily give themselves into slavery (Lev. 25:39–40). Such individuals would be held
as a “hired servant” rather than a “bondservant” and would be
subject to the release of the jubilee (Lev. 25:39–40).
The second source of biblical slavery was that of a debt-slave.
“Israelites who became heavily indebted could be forced to surrender or sell children or themselves” to appease the demands of
their creditors.55 Scriptural clarification of the law surrounding
Ibid.
See Falk, 115.
55
Callender, 74; see also Westbrook, “The Development of Law In the
Ancient Near East,” 1631, 1651–54.
53
54
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debt-slavery is limited at best. There is, however, one example of
how these laws were applied:
Now there cried a certain woman of the wives of the sons of the
prophets unto Elisha, saying, Thy servant my husband is dead;
and thou knowest that thy servant did fear the Lord: and the
creditor is come to take unto him my two sons to be bondmen.
(2 Kings 4:1)

Either the borrower or the borrower’s sons could become a
servant to the creditor (see Prov. 22:7). This type of servitude was
subject to the seventh-year release provision found in the
Covenant Code as well as the general release in the jubilee year. A
debt-slave could, however, extend his term of servitude beyond the
sixth or forty-ninth year for life (see Exod. 21:5)—a relationship
similar, if not identical, to chattel slavery. Thus, under these circumstances, “debt-slaves were extremely vulnerable to being
forced into chattel slavery.”56 During harsh economic conditions,
including times of famine, the difference between those that “waxeth poor” and those that couldn’t pay their debts was probably
insignificant. Hebrews would have been forced to sell themselves
into slavery for life—a close cousin to selling title to a person in
fee simple.57 Even though this may have been the general practice,
Old Testament prophets, like Nehemiah, continually brought the
Israelites back to the ideal principle of debt forgiveness (see, e.g.,
Neh. 5:1–13).Although absolute forgiveness may not have been frequently granted, biblical law also provided for redemption of the

Callender, 74.
One author noted, “All that scholars have written regarding enslavement
through debt loses much of its importance once it is appreciated that the borderline between the enslavement of debtors and the voluntary sale of children or
self is one that is very easy to obscure” (Urbach, 12–13).
56
57
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debt by a debtor’s next of kin58 or possibly even by the debtor if
the debtor was wealthy enough (Lev. 25:47–49).59 Most likely, redemption did not completely exonerate the debtor; it merely
transferred the debt to a more charitable master. “It must be presumed that . . . the majority of those who redeemed Jews who had
been sold as slaves to Gentiles retained them as slaves in their own
service.”60 This presumption is valid due to the way in which
Jehovah redeemed the children of Israel: “For I brought thee up
out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed thee out of the house of
servants” (Mic. 6:4), “and what doth the Lord require of thee, but
to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God”
(Mic. 6:8). Jehovah was the new debtor and set the new terms of
servitude.
Finally, at certain times in Israelite history, captives of war
provided a significant source of forced labor.61 Of course, this
source proved more fruitful during times of war than during times
of peace. This may explain why Hebrew masters in Jeremiah 34
found it so difficult to release their Hebrew slaves—the supply
of captured slaves had been depleted and so the Israelites were
relying upon Hebrew slaves to replace prisoners of war in the economic societal structure. During monarchial periods, forced labor
was used to build the temple and other large-scale projects.62
Forced servitude upon Hebrews was contrary to biblical law and
policy: “For unto me the children of Israel are servants; they are
58
The previously referenced example in 2 Kings 4:1–6 provides an example
of the symbolic significance of Jehovah as the ultimate redeemer. Although the
prophet Elisha is the pronouncer of redemption in the story, the reader recognizes that his calling as Jehovah’s servant (or agent) makes Jehovah the redeemer,
not Elisha. Jehovah is the one who provides the means whereby the debt is repaid. Therefore, the woman would have been the servant of Jehovah thereafter.
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my servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt: I am
the Lord your God” (Lev. 25:55).
Southern Sources of Slavery. In America there was not the same
distinction between a foreigner and a community citizen as there
was in biblical law: The primary source of slaves was from the
African slave trade. Slavery in America became a legal institution
during the 1660s. Prior to 1660, legal records and statutes referred
to negro laborers as servants, not slaves.63 In 1664, a Maryland
statute declared, “[A]ll negroes or other slaves already in the
Province, or to be imported thereafter, should serve for life.”64
Such laws constituted the initial passport of the African slave trade
in America.
It has been suggested that even the most ardent supporters of
the slave trade itself “admitted that the slave trade was barbaric
and immoral.”65 The maritime journey from Africa to the
American colonies was so arduous that only one out of every three
slaves survived.66 Nevertheless, despite this high mortality rate, the
slave trade continued to produce significant profits.67 The slave
trade was a point of debate in the Constitutional Convention of
1787; yet, due to the bipolar positions of the Northern and the
Southern states, the Convention chose to table the matter in
hopes of obtaining other compromises.68
By the time the Constitution was ratified in 1789, most states,
both Northern and Southern, had outlawed the slave trade. For
example, a 1787 Rhode Island statute “censure[d] [the slave trade]
Robert B. Shaw, A Legal History of Slavery in the United States (Potsdam,
New York: Northern Press, 1991) 4. Act XVI of Virginia statutes (1659–1660) was
the first statute to grant colonists a specific right to “import ‘negro slaves’” (Shaw,
4).
64
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Congress, 1985) 211.
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Ibid.
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in strong terms, as contrary to the principles of justice, humanity,
and sound policy”69 and imposed a pecuniary penalty “on every
citizen who as master, agent, or owner shall buy, sell or receive on
board his ship for sale any slave.”70 Nevertheless, despite the Slave
Trade Prohibition Act of March 2, 1807, which prohibited the
slave trade on a national level, slave traders continued to operate
on a limited basis,71 and slavery continued to flourish.
The elimination of the slave trade did not, by any means,
eliminate slavery or its source. The slave trade had been, in principle, eliminated, or at least drastically reduced. Nevertheless, by
the early part of the nineteenth century, there were hundreds of
thousands of negro slaves in the South, increasing for their masters in perpetuity. Slaveholders were not as dependent on the slave
trade to supply them with slaves because of the natural increases
in the negro population. However, race perpetuated what the slave
trade had started.
Although race has historically been an irrelevant factor in slave
systems throughout the world (e.g. the slave system in the Old
Testament), it played a central role in American slavery.72
Historians recognize that, for the most part, “in other times and
places enslavement was never confined to a single race or ethnic
group.”73 Not until the American slave system did such a peculiarity occur.
This principle of selecting slaves based upon race evidences
one of the most significant differences between the Israelite slave
system and slavery as it took place in the South. In the South,
John Codman Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United
States, vol. 2 (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 49.
70
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Alabama (1823); Louisiana (1804) (Hurd, 49, 75, 95, 101, 143, 150, 156).
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“[o]nly blacks could be slaves; no one else, however great their
misfortune.”74 On the other hand, the Israelite slave system provided not only for the enslavement of its own people but also
limited the terms of enslavement in order to prevent misfortune
from involuntarily enslaving an individual for life; debts could be
paid or redeemed, providing the Israelite citizen with an opportunity to regain social status and respectability. The American slave
system denied blacks this opportunity. Even free blacks in the
South75 were prevented from full social equality simply because of
their race.76 The United States Supreme Court, in Dred Scott v.
Sandford summarized the peculiar race-based system driving slavery in America:
[Blacks] had for more than a century before been regarded as
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully
be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold,
and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic,
whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that
time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white
race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics,
which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to

Ibid., 6.
Ibid. Despite only referring to free blacks in the South, the author of this
paper does recognize that blacks living in the North were also not treated equally
as whites. Nevertheless, blacks in the North were granted much more social
equality than blacks in the South.
76
See Mark V. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), 142–47 (suggesting that there were conceptual problems in the South with a presumption based on race).
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[I]t was administratively inefficient to create presumptions flowing from race,
and, despite the conceptual problems entailed by the need to adjust those presumptions to the rule that status and not race was dispositive, the pervasive
racism of Southern society supported the move away from status and toward
race as a categorizing device. (Tushnet, 147)
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dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily
and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as
in matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment
the correctness of this opinion.77

Chief Justice Taney further asserted “that neither the class of
persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants,
whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as
part of the people, nor intended to be included in” the
Constitution.78
There was no legal mechanism to prevent race-based slavery
in America. America’s slave system was never clearly defined in
statutory form; rather, it merely evolved according to the social
policy and economic demands of American society. Because the
American slave laws were never conclusively established before the
practice took root in American society, trying to embrace subsequently established slave laws within the already established body
of common and statutory law was like trying to fit a square peg
into a round hole.79 The slave laws in America simply did not harmonize with the constitutional principles that people in the
United States, even immigrants from other European countries,
had been “created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.”80 There was a serious disconnect between
the laws governing slavery and the accepted body of common and
statutory law.81
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
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It may be helpful at this point in the analysis to point out that
the biblical slave system did not suffer from such a disconnect
between the laws themselves and the legal policies of the society.
Although current ambiguities exist regarding the interpretation of
biblical slave laws, the laws corresponded with the lodestar policy
that Jehovah was the ultimate master, and that because he
provided mercy to the enslaved Israelites in Egypt, the Israelites
themselves should provide mercy to their fellow citizens.

Points of Legal Comparison
In addition to the differences regarding how individuals were
enslaved, the Old Testament and the South granted slaves varying
levels of legal status, the analysis of which presents a plethora of
complex legal and social issues. Among the issues researched by
scholars today are (1) the extent to which male and female slaves
were treated differently under the law,82 (2) the slave’s right to vote
and participate in local and national government processes, (3) the
slave’s legal right to file and/or be a party to a lawsuit, (4) the extent of the master’s sexual rights over the slave, and (5) the slave’s
right to marry and have children. Extensive research has been
done with respect to each of these elements of legal status.
However, this paper attempts to narrow the scope of the analysis
by examining Hebrew law and the laws of the American South
with respect to (a) the master-servant relationship, (b) the duration of servitude, and (c) the slave’s ability to own property.
The Master and Servant in the Old Testament. As stated earlier,
the master–servant relationship in biblical law was symbolic of the
relationship between Jehovah and his people. On numerous occasions in the Old Testament, Jehovah explains to the children of
Israel that he is their master and they are his servants (or slaves),

82
See, generally, Matitiahu Tsevat, “The Hebrew Slave According to
Deuteronomy 15:12–18,” JBL 113–4 (1994): 587–95.
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and should therefore be submissive to doing His will (see, e.g.,
Lev. 25:42, 55; Mic. 6:4; Deut. 5:15, 7:8, 9:26, 13:5, 21:8). Moreover,
the temporary nature of the master–slave relationship between a
Hebrew master and a Hebrew slave “provided for a friendly relationship between master and servant.”83 Thus, the slave system of
the Old Testament, like many other aspects of the Hebrew Law,
had a tendency to remind the Israelites of their relationship to
God as they interacted socially with their slaves or masters.
The Lord’s continual reminder to the Israelites that He had
“brought [them] out of Egypt, from the house of slavery” (Deut.
7:8), reinforces the notion that the children of Israel are servants
“and therefore cannot rightfully be ‘servants’ of others, whether
another god, a domestic or foreign king, or another Israelite.”84 As
servants of Jehovah, the Israelites were required to strictly obey the
Lord’s commandments (see Lev. 25:18).85 Failure to do so would
subject the Israelites individually and collectively to the Lord’s
punishment. Nevertheless, the master-servant analogy in Israelite
society begins to break down with respect to the master’s power
over the agent. In theory and practice, the Hebrew master did not
have unlimited power.86 But, God had unlimited power over his
people. Perhaps this break in the symbolism was strategic in eliciting humility and submission from the Israelites, from both the
masters and the slaves. The Hebrew master was not above the law
but was obligated to adhere to it, whereas the Southern master actually molded the law in order to maintain the divisive social
structure.
The Master and Servant in the South. In Chastain v. Bowman
et al., the court held “that a master may constitute his slave his
Falk, 116.
Callender, 79.
85
Lev. 25:18: “Wherefore ye shall do my statutes, and keep my judgments,
and do them; and ye shall dwell in the land in safety.”
86
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agent,” and that there was no “distinction between the circumstances which constitute a slave and a freeman an agent. They are
both the creatures of the principal, and act upon his authority.”87
Despite this court’s assertion that the agency laws of the freeman
and the Southern slave were the same, in reality they were quite
different in the extent to which the master could punish the agent
and the extent to which the agent could seek redress for unlawful
punishment.
Wheeler notes that because a Southern slave was considered
the master’s property, the master could exercise “unlimited power”
over the slave.88 It is a weak argument indeed to suggest that a
white agent during the same time period was the legal property of
his master. But was the master’s power really unlimited? Many
Southern states enacted laws that limited the types of punishments
a master could render to his slave.89 However, most scholars agree
that these limits were without any real practical effect: “If limitations to [a master’s power] have, at some points, and in some of
the [s]tates, appeared to be interposed, it has been found, on a
close scrutiny, to be only an appearance, and not a reality.”90
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Jacob D. Wheeler, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Slavery (New York:
Negro Universities Press, 1968) 228. “A slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his
industry and his labor. He can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire any
thing, but what must belong to his master” William Goodell, The American Slave
Code (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968) 23 (quoting a Louisiana statute,
Civil Code, Art. 35).
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See Part IV for examples of slave laws that, on their face, limit the master’s power to punish.
90
Goodell, 155.

In the vitally important matters of absolute purchase, sale, seizure for debt, inheritance, distribution, marriage, (or rather, no marriage,) annihilation of family sanctities, incapacity to possess property, to make a contract, or to receive
wages in the appointment of labor, supply of food, clothing, and habitations,
we have seen the power of the master every thing, the rights, the protection, the
defense, the redress, and the power of the slave, nothing!
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The only real limitation to a master’s power was that “he
had to live under rules designed to protect all of Southern society.”91 For the most part, “Judges refused to interfere with the
master-servant relationship if other free persons benefited from a
shareowner’s actions,” but Judges would quickly interfere when
the master’s actions posed a threat to the protection of the slave
system in the South.92 For example:
[M]asters could beat their slaves but could not withhold food.
People could host parties to distract slaves from daily burdens
or to keep slaves busily making quilts or foodstuffs, but they
usually could not give slaves drums, horns, or guns. Slave owners could trust slaves to convey and receive certain goods, but
they could not ask slaves to whip white trespassers masters
could beat their slaves but could not withhold food. People
could host parties to.93

Additionally, in Southern society, black agents were restricted
from bringing actions against their masters; black agents had no
legal method of recourse. The 1856 Dred Scott94 decision illustrates
this principle, holding that a black man could not bring an action
against a white master because the Constitution did not grant citizenship to a black man.95 There was no set of laws that protected
the Southern slave from abuse or mistreatment. State courts and
legislatures in the South failed to provide protections for the black
minority class.96 Thus, in all reality, slave laws in the South failed
91
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Common Law of Southern Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
8.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
94
See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
95
Ibid., 454.
96
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elevated above the courts and the legislature, giving a Southern master supreme
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to impose any real restrictions on a master’s power over his agent
(slave) other than those societal restrictions that were required to
maintain order within the established slave system.
Duration of Servitude in the Old Testament. As previously discussed,97 Hebrew slaves were required by law to be released after
six years of service: “And if thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an
Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years; then
in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee” (Deut.
15:12; see also Exod. 21:2–3, Jer. 34:13). And, although the law of
the jubilee supposedly granted a release to “every man unto his
possession”(Lev. 25:10) every fiftieth year, Leviticus 25:44–46 supports the notion that the jubilee release only applied to the
Hebrew slave.
On the other hand, the Holiness Code makes it clear that the
duration of servitude for a foreign slave (a heathen) could extend
for the lifetime of the slave and beyond (Lev. 25:44–46).
Accordingly, heathen slaves could be purchased “as bondsmen” or
a chattel slaves (Lev. 25:42), and could therefore be passed in perpetuity in the estate of the master: “And ye shall take [your
heathen slaves] as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession.” (Lev. 25:46). It follows that in order
to pass through inheritance, heathen slaves would have been classified as property. There is no indication as to whether the
Israelites viewed their heathen slaves as real property or personal
property. Nevertheless, heathen slaves were bought and sold on
the open market (Lev. 25:42, 45). One assumes the Israelites did
not journey to a foreign land simply to purchase foreign slaves.
Thus, one can deduce that there was probably some kind of international commerce (or slave trade) that transported foreign
slaves to Israelite masters. However, it is debatable just how extensive this slave trade was. Jeremiah 34:8–16, however, suggests that,
approximately 600 b.c., foreign slaves were very rare; thus, the
97

See Part II.
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Israelites had resorted to holding their Hebrew slaves beyond the
year of the jubilee.
The Hebrew laws regarding fugitive slaves are not explicit.
Nevertheless, they provide some guidance as to how fugitive slaves
were treated under the law. There seems to be some indication that
a Hebrew slave owner had the right to repossess slaves that had
fled from his rightful possession (see, e.g., 1 Sam. 30:15; 1 Kings
2:39). However, as Falk suggests, there is also scriptural support for
the notion that “the land of Israel, being a divine domain, was
therefore an asylum for fugitive slaves.”98 This argument seems impractical because slaves served an important labor function in
Israelite society. Slaves had a fair market value and were relied
upon for social progress. Nevertheless, the laws regarding the seventh year release and the jubilee release may have decreased the
need for a Hebrew slave to flee from his master. The foreign slave,
however, did not enjoy such temporary servitude. In any event, it
was permissible for a Hebrew master to manumit99 his slaves without restriction.100 Falk even suggests, “we may assume some
manumissions to have taken the form of a dedication to God and
to have been witnessed by a deed.”101
Duration of Servitude for Southern Slaves. Perhaps the greatest
reason American slavery flourished even after the elimination of
the slave trade was that slavery continued in perpetuity, thereby allowing Southern masters to increase their slave populations
internally rather than having to solely rely on external sources
for increase. Southern law and policy makers justified this rule,
reasoning that “the hereditary nature of slavery [had] probably
been an incident of the institution in every age and among every
Falk, 121, note 37.
For a general discussion regarding the structure of the manumission laws
in Deuteronomy 15, see Hamilton, 19–31.
100
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101
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people where the institution [had] been tolerated.”102Therefore,
issue born to a slave woman was the property of the master and
continued to be the property of the legatee in the master’s estate.103
Because slaves were considered personal and real property they
passed through the master’s will,105 and if the master had no will
through intestate succession.
Many Southern states passed legislation, declaring slaves to be
the property of their masters. For example, Virginia passed a law
in 1792–1793 in which slaves were adjudged to be part of the “personal estate” of their masters.106 A 1798 Kentucky statute deemed
slaves to be real estate.107 Louisiana passed a statute in 1806 defining slaves as “real estate.”108 Although states had legislatively
defined black slaves as property, enforcing them as such was altogether another matter.
Relying upon Article IV, Section 2, clause 3 of the
Constitution,109 Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,
which authorized the arrest of fugitive slaves who had fled from
their masters and prescribed procedure for the slaves’ eventual return to their masters.110 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which
102
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replaced the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, essentially increased the powers to apprehend fugitive slaves. Southern states, especially those
that bordered the North, demanded some type of enforcement
mechanism for apprehending fugitive slaves. Southern masters
“recognized that the influence of escapes on those remaining in
slavery was considerable.”111
Similar apprehensions existed in the South regarding the
manumission of slaves. “Although the [Southern] legal system
countenanced kindness to slaves, it curtailed masters’ indulgence
of their slaves if such behavior infringed on the well-being of the
community.”112 In most states, a master was prevented from manumitting his slaves unless legislation permitted doing so. For
example, an 1852 Louisiana law permitted a master to manumit his
slave “only on condition that [the slave] be sent out of the United
States.”113 An 1834 Alabama statute stated, “County courts may authorize owners for meritorious causes to emancipate, provided
that the emancipation shall remove out of the State ‘never more
to return.’”114 From the perspective of Southern society, the
manumission of slaves would produce unwanted social consequences: “By setting one’s slaves free, one might release an agitator, weaken the profitable system of forced labor, dump a nonproductive individual on the state, or remove the value of slave
property from the tax base or the reach of creditors.”115 Although
this reasoning seems ludicrous today, it existed in the minds of
Southern policy makers and judges.116 Ultimately, holding people

111
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as chattel property required Southern masters to claim title not
only to the body but also to the soul of the slave117—a despicable
proposition.
Property Rights of Old Testament Slaves. Israelite slave law suggests that Hebrew slaves had limited property rights.118 Even while
the Israelites were enslaved in Egypt they were allowed to own
property: “And the Lord shall sever between the cattle of Israel and
the cattle of Egypt: and there shall nothing die of all that is the
children’s of Israel” (Exod. 9:4). The Israelites were able to own
cattle during their enslavement in Egypt. After the Code of the
Covenant was received, Hebrew slaves continued to have some
property rights. A Hebrew slave who was heavily in debt and had
become enslaved to a creditor could either be redeemed by a relative “or if he [was] able, he [could] redeem himself ” (Lev. 25:49).
This suggests that Hebrew slaves were not prohibited from owning property even during the time of servitude.119 Additionally, a
Hebrew master was commanded to give of his personal property
to a slave upon the slave’s release:
And when thou sendest him out free from thee, thou shalt not
let him go away empty: Thou shalt furnish him liberally out of
thy flock, and out of thy floor, and out of thy winepress: of that
wherewith the Lord thy God hath blessed thee thou shalt give
unto him. (Deut. 15:13–14)

It is possible that the master would have been at liberty to distribute some of his property to his slave prior to the slave’s release.120
See Goodell, 69.
See, e.g., Ezek. 46:17 (giving a servant a life interest in a gift made by a
prince); Prov. 17:2 (stating the possibility that a servant can have a part in the inheritance of his master); Prov. 29:21 (suggesting that a master who raises a servant
from childhood has a duty to provide for the servant).
119
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Neither the Code of the Covenant, the Holiness Code, or the
Deuteronomic Code indicates whether foreign slaves were entitled
to own property. Because the Israelites themselves had been
granted the privilege of owning and acquiring personal property
while enslaved in Egypt, it is likely that they would have continued this practice to a limited extent with their own foreign slaves.
Property Rights of Southern Slaves. Southern slaves laws, on the
other hand, prevented slaves in America from owning any property, real and personal. This rule was established in both the
Southern common law as well as in Southern legislative acts. For
example, in Brandon et al. v. Planters’ and Merchants’ Bank of
Huntsville, the court held that a slave was prevented from acquiring or possessing property.121 An 1806 Louisiana statute states, “As
the person of a slave belongs to his master, no slave can possess
anything in his own right or dispose in any way of the produce of
his industry without the consent of his master.”122 In the event that
a slave was able to acquire any property, the property instantly belonged to the master.123 In some Southern states, it was unlawful
for the master to even allow the slave to be hired out for the personal gain of the slave. For example, in Virginia, if the master
permitted “his slave to hire himself out, it is made lawful for any
person and the duty of the sheriff, &c. to apprehend such slave,
&c.; and the master shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor
more than thirty.”124 The purpose of the Southern slave laws regarding property, both the laws defining slaves as property and the
laws preventing them from acquiring it, were calculated to keep
the slave in complete subjection to the master. The master was
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elevated above the law and was the supreme authority over his
slaves—able to do with them as he pleased.

Treatment of Slaves
Old Testament Treatment of Slaves. Modern knowledge of how
Israelite masters, in fact, treated their slaves, both Hebrew and foreign, is extremely limited. What is known, however, is how the
Egyptian masters treated their Israelite slaves and the laws contained in the Covenant Code, the Holiness Code, and the
Deuteronomic Code regarding the treatment of slaves.
The Israelites were treated very harshly by their Egyptian masters: “And the Egyptians made the children of Israel to serve with
rigour: And they made their lives bitter with hard bondage, in
morter, and in brick, and in all manner of service in the field: all
their service, wherein they made them serve, was with rigour”
(Exod. 1:13–14). The account of Moses killing the Egyptian who
was caught “smiting an Hebrew, one of his brethren” (Exod. 2:11)
is also illustrative that Egyptian masters beat and whipped their
slaves into submission.
The Hebrew Law regarding the treatment of slaves suggests
that the Israelites did not forget their misery under their heavyhanded Egyptian masters. In general, the Israelites were instructed
not to “oppress one another” (Lev. 25:17): “Thou shalt not rule
over [thy slave] with rigour; but shalt fear thy God” (Lev. 25:43).
Hebrew masters were not to treat their slaves as to incite fear in
them; that was the job of Jehovah – their supreme master. This
general principle was applied in several specific instances. One law
provided that if a master smote his slave, and the slave died within
two days, the master would be put to death (see Exod. 21:12,
20–21). The presumption was that proximate cause did not exist
after the two-day period lapsed.125 If a master put out the eye of his
slave, the slave would be set free without any compensation to
the master (Exod. 21:26). The same was true if a master knocked
125
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out his servant’s tooth (see Exod. 21:27). Finally, the requirement
that a master freely impart of his substance to a departing Hebrew
slave (see Deut. 15:13–15) suggests that the ultimate objective of the
biblical law was not subjection to the master but liberation from
servitude. A Hebrew master “could beat his slave and punish him
for alleged misconduct,”126 but, because the slave would most
likely return to equal standing in the community with the master
after the slave’s release, it was in the master’s best interest to treat
his slaves kindly. There was no social or economic pressure to
do otherwise, at least not ideally. This ideal may not have always
reflected reality.127
Southern Treatment of Slaves. Southern society saw a great
contradiction in the laws regarding the treatment of slaves and the
actual treatment of slaves. Many Southern states passed laws that,
on their face, required masters to treat their slaves humanely. For
example, a 1799 Tennessee law prescribed the death penalty for
any person who “willfully or maliciously kill[ed] any
negro . . . [and] shall be deemed guilty of murder, as if such
person so killed had been a freeman.”128 However, a proviso is
added to the act, stating, “this act shall not be extended to any
person killing any slave in the act of resistance to his lawful owner
or master, or any slave dying under moderate correction.”129 The
Georgia Constitution contained a similar provision.130 How
moderate was “moderate correction”? Most likely, very severe
treatment was justified as moderate correction.131
Ibid., 115.
See Neh. 5:1–13 (suggesting that servitude was often harsh and definitely
not the desired way of life even for the poor, indebted Israelites).
128
Stroud, 23; see also Hurd, 150 (describing a similarly drafted Alabama
statute enacted in 1819).
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
In 1740, South Carolina passed a law prohibiting a master from willfully
cutting out his slave’s tongue, putting out the slave’s eye, castrating, scalding,
burning, or doing any other form of cruel punishment to the slave, “other than
by whipping, or beating with a horsewhip, cowskin, switch, or small stick, or by
putting irons on, or confining or imprisoning such slave” (Goodell, 159–60).
126
127
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It may be helpful to examine several more typical state statutes
that, on their face, provide some protection to the slave, but in reality leave the door open for master brutality. An 1852 Alabama law
provided that “[t]he master must treat his slave with humanity
and must not inflict upon him any cruel punishment.” Yet, the
master was also permitted to “enforce obedience on the part of the
slave to all his lawful commands.”132 A Louisiana statute stated,
“The slave is entirely subject to the will of his master, who may
correct and chastise him, though not with unusual rigor, nor so as
to maim or mutilate him, or to expose him to the danger of loss
of life, or so as to cause his death.”133 Here again, if what is “unusual” is defined by the customary norm, then the slave could be
treated extremely harshly and it would not be done with “unusual
rigor.”134
In addition to the law not providing adequate protection
against master abuse, the law also failed to protect a slave against
cruel and unusual criminal punishment. Shaw contends that, in
general, slaves were penalized much more severely than their white
counterparts.135 He refers to the extreme example in Virginia
where there were three crimes (treason, first degree murder, and
arson) for which the death penalty was invoked on a white man
but sixty-eight crimes for which a slave could be put to death.136
There were two principle reasons for this oddity:
First of all, it was one of the techniques for keeping slaves in absolute subjection to the white community and imbuing them
with a spirit of docility and instant obedience. Secondly, for
persons already bound to life-long servitude, imprisonment by
itself was not a particularly strong deterrent.137
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However well intentioned the Southern slave laws may have
been in protecting the slave from mistreatment, the real evil of the
system was its inability to enforce the laws.138 Stroud asserts that
this situation arose because black slaves were not permitted to testify against their white masters at trial.139 Indeed, the possibility of
convicting a white master in the South was very slim if all black
testimony was excluded from trial. In the end, state statutes failed
to protect slaves from mistreatment by their masters.

Conclusion
Modern scholars know much more about the slave laws in the
American South than they do about the slave laws in ancient
Israel. Though a sketchpad of the Israelite slave system is available
in Old Testament text, it is still difficult to ascertain exactly
how biblical masters and slaves related to one another on a
daily basis. It is therefore inappropriate for modern readers
to apply modern notions of slavery to biblical texts. How
should modern biblical readers understand slavery in the Bible?
Need modern readers ignore the biblical institution of slavery altogether? Such a question should be emphatically answered in the
negative. The reality is that slavery did exist and probably flourished under the Law of Moses. Slavery was most likely a dominant
aspect in biblical society.
But, biblical slavery can be distinguished from Southern slavery in important ways. The Southern slave system negated the
existence of the person, evidencing a total devaluation of humanity, whereas the Old Testament slave laws established a threshold
level of humanity and dignity, which the Israelites were obligated
not to cross. The check that prevented the Israelite slave system
from paralleling the Southern slave system was the realization by
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each Hebrew master that they too were slaves—slaves to their
God: “Behold, we are servants this day, and for the land that thou
gavest unto our fathers to eat the fruit thereof and the good
thereof, behold, we are servants in it” (Neh. 9:36). God had given
the Israelites the land; therefore, the land belonged to the Lord—
their master: “Behold, as the eyes of servants look unto the hand
of their masters, . . . so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God until
that he have mercy upon us” (Ps. 123:2). Ultimately, Israelite slavery, if practiced according to divinely established law, was more
than an economic social structure; it was a daily reminder of an
Israelite’s identity—for the slave and the master.

